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Abstract
We adopt a structural approach to studying the eﬀects of public transfers on consumption
smoothing, risk sharing and welfare in small village economies. We calibrate the key para-
meters of a dynamic limited commitment model using data gathered as part of the Mexican
Progresa program, and take advantage of the randomized experimental design of the data to
validate the model using the treatment sample. The limited commitment model enriched to
allow for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences can reasonably well explain consumption dy-
namics and cross-sectional distributions. The calibrated model correctly predicts the increase
in consumption smoothing of transfers’ recipients, and the decrease in risk sharing between
beneﬁciaries and non beneﬁciaries of the program. Progresa transfers are found to crowd-out
between 3% and 10% of the pre-existing private transfers, but the overall direct eﬀect of the
subsidy on consumption is welfare improving for all households. Last, we use our structural
model to evaluate a counterfactual, fully funded, insurance scheme.
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Village economies in developing countries are characterized by high volatility in individual
incomes. Recent empirical work ﬁnd that in these economies changes in household consumption
are systematically related to changes in household income over time, rejecting the hypothesis
of full risk pooling or complete insurance. However, there does appear to be a certain level
of risk sharing, even if far from complete (Townsend, 1994, Udry, 1994, Ligon, Thomas and
Worrall, 2002, among others).1 Households in these small societies often lack access to a
developed ﬁnancial sector, nonetheless establish a system of informal credit or "quasi-credit"
transactions as a means to smooth consumption over time.
Governments are often involved in designing policies to provide insurance against risk or
in general to alleviate poverty in village economies. These policies, however, could aﬀect the
incentives of households to participate in the informal insurance arrangements that are in place
before the public intervention. In evaluating the eﬀect of public transfers programs, it is then
of paramount importance to understand their inﬂuence on individual behaviour and on the
pre-existing private arrangements to share risk. In this paper, we study the eﬀects of public
transfers on consumption smoothing, risk sharing and welfare in small village economies. We
take advantage of the observable experience of a transfers program to calibrate and validate a
structural behavioural model, which is then used to conduct counterfactual policies.
Our starting point is a dynamic limited commitment model, which is considered to be
an appropriate framework to describe the economies under consideration.2 In the context
of limited commitment environments, the degree of risk sharing that can be sustained in
equilibrium diﬀers depending on the parameters that characterize household preferences and
uncertainty. The predicted eﬀects of public transfers on private risk sharing arrangements also
depend upon those same parameters.
A ﬁrst goal of this paper is to calibrate the key parameters of a limited commitment model
using observed earnings and consumption patterns of households in poor small villages.
We incorporate in the model the main features of a small agricultural economy: idiosyn-
cratic income uncertainty, public information and limited commitment with lack of enforce-
ment, informal contingent contracts, and the possibility of defaulting on these contracts and
reverting to self-insurance through a storage technology. Allowing for savings is important in
order to measure the extent of risk sharing in the economy. Not only savings are a means to
self-insure and thus smooth consumption over time, but they can also constitute a commit-
1Notable exceptions are Ogaki and Zhang (2001), who do not reject the full insurance hypothesis within
Pakistani and Indian villages when assuming a Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion utility function. Mazzocco
and Saini (2007) assume heterogeneous risk preferences and also do not reject eﬃcient risk sharing at the caste
level in rural India.
2Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002), for example, ﬁnd that a dynamic limited commitment model performs
much better than both the full insurance and the autarky models to predict the response of consumption to
idiosyncratic income shocks in three Indian villages.
2ment device, when used as collateral (see Gobert and Poitevin, 2002, and Ligon, Thomas and
Worrall, 2000).
We use the data set gathered as part of the Mexican Progresa transfers program.3 Progresa
is a large anti-poverty program begun in Mexico in 1997, whose main goal is to increase the
human capital of poor households in rural villages. It provides educational subsidies (contingent
on children’s regular schooling attendance), some cash transfers and nutritional supplements
for infants and small children. The beneﬁts that families receive are substantial relative to their
income level, so that the program can be seen as both an insurance scheme aimed at limiting
the impact of bad shocks to income and a long-term human capital development policy.
The fact that the Progresa villages are in general agricultural, small and isolated, and the
fact that all village households are surveyed by Progresa allow us to clearly deﬁne the risk
sharing pool as the households belonging to the same village.
We adopt the restrictions derived from the theory to investigate whether the model is able to
match key features of the observed data. We ﬁnd that a version of the model enriched to allow
for heterogeneous preferences can reasonably well ﬁt the dynamic response of consumption to
income and the cross-sectional variation of consumption given the income distribution. There
does exist, however, as also found in Ligon et al. (2002), a trade-oﬀ between consumption
time-series dynamics and cross-sectional distribution: the model cannot very precisely ﬁt both
at the same time.
A second goal of the paper is to determine the validity of the model exploiting the random-
ized experimental design of the data. In the Progresa social experiment the Mexican villages
were randomly assigned to either participate in the program or to serve as controls. Being con-
trol and treatment groups randomly drawn by the same population, the relevant behavioural
model should apply to both. Following an approach pioneered by Todd and Wolpin (2006),
we calibrate the model using data on households in the randomized-out control group. We
then assess its performance by comparing the impact of the program predicted by the model
(obtained simulating the model behaviour under the subsidies scheme) to the impact obtained
under the experiment, observed in the treatment villages.
The limited commitment model accurately predicts the impact of a public transfers pro-
gram on the beneﬁciary households’ consumption smoothing and on the risk sharing between
recipients and non recipients in the villages. In particular, we ﬁnd that in evaluating the eﬀects
of a public policy such as Progresa it is of paramount importance to take into consideration
the heterogeneous responses in individual behaviour dictated by diﬀerent preferences.
Further, our results suggest that the Progresa transfers crowd-out between 3% and 10% of
the pre-existing private transfers, but nonetheless lead to an overall increase in consumption
and welfare for all households.
Finally, the main advantage of our structural approach is that we can use the behavioural
model to predict the impact of counterfactual policies meant to provide insurance against
3The program is still running in Mexico under the name of Oportunidades.
3uncertainty. The dynamic model is used to perform an evaluation of a social insurance program
against individual uncertainty in which transfers are conditional on idiosyncratic shocks, and
such that the subsidies are fully ﬁnanced by the population through a proportional income tax.
The results from the calibrated model show that while there is some crowding-out of private
transfers, overall consumption smoothing would improve as a result of the insurance policy.
Nonetheless such a policy would not be welfare enhancing for all households: depending on
preferences, some households would gain and some would loose from the introduction of the
insurance scheme.
Eventually, one could design and test alternative transfers schemes that could be imple-
mented in order to improve eﬃciency in the presence of enforceability problems.
Many studies have addressed the issue of the potential crowding-out of private transfers
by public ones (Cox,1987, Cox, Hansen and Jimenez, 1999, Attanasio and Rios-Rull, 2000b,
Albarran and Attanasio, 2001, among others). In particular, Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000a)
show that in environments with limited commitment a public insurance program can improve
as well as deteriorate welfare, depending on the characteristics of the underlying economy.
Their numerical exercises ﬁnd that key elements to understand and evaluate these crowding-
out eﬀects are agents’ preferences, the persistence of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks and
the relative variance of aggregate and idiosyncratic risks. Similarly, Krueger and Perri (2005)
analyze the eﬀect of a change in the progressivity of the tax system on the incentives private
agents have to engage in private risk sharing arrangements. They calibrate their model to US
income and tax data and ﬁnd that a more redistributive tax system could indeed lead to less
risk sharing and lower ex-ante welfare.
In the empirical literature, Albarran and Attanasio (2001, 2003) use the data sets from the
Progresa program to reject the hypothesis of full risk sharing, and ﬁnd that the program does
crowd-out private transfers (the program decreases both the likelihood to receive a transfer
and the amount received conditional on receiving one). Skouﬁas (2007) performs a test of
full risk sharing using the Progresa data, and ﬁnds that consumption changes are signiﬁcantly
correlated with income changes, thus rejecting the complete insurance hypothesis. Moreover,
his analysis reveals that Progresa does not aﬀect risk sharing within the treated villages, even
if the recipient households in these villages do smooth consumption better.
The novel approach in our research is the direct link we draw between a dynamic behav-
ioural model and the observed micro-data. We use the data to calibrate the model and validate
the calibration taking advantage of the experimental design of Progresa. Moreover, modelling
explicitly household behaviour enables us to perform welfare analysis of the Progresa subsidy
and of an alternative counterfactual insurance policy.
The next section describes the model, which builds on Krueger and Perri (2006). Section
3 brieﬂy introduces the Progresa program and the data we use, while Section 4 describes the
estimation procedure. In Section 5 we present our results and Section 6 concludes.
42. The Model
We consider a pure exchange economy, populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived agents
of measure one. Time is discrete. Households face idiosyncratic uncertainty in their labour
endowments, and there is no aggregate uncertainty. Agents can share risk by trading each
period a complete set of Arrow securities which are contingent on the observable labour en-
dowment realizations. However, contracts cannot be enforced, and individuals can renege on
their payments, in which case they lose all savings and they are excluded from future trade
in the insurance market. We ﬁrst describe in detail the individual problem, and then deﬁne
the equilibrium for this economy. We shall specify more precisely the functional forms of the
model economy in a later section.
2.1. The Individual Problem
The population is divided into three diﬀerent groups, with pg indicating the fraction of agents
belonging to group g ∈ G ≡ {1,2,3}. Each group is meant to capture the rich set of observed
household characteristics that deﬁne the entitlement to program transfers in the empirical im-
plementation. Groups are characterized by diﬀerent levels of expected earnings. At each period
t, household i belonging to group g receives a labour endowment αglit, where αg denotes the
deterministic group-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, while lit is an idiosyncratic shock, lit ∈ L ≡ {l1,..,lN},
that follows a Markov process with transition probabilities π(l′/l) = prob{lt+1 = l′/lt = l}.
We assume a law of large numbers, so that the fraction of agents in the population who face




∀l ∈ L. Let Π( ) be the unique invariant measure corresponding to π(l′/l), and denote with
lt
i = {li0,li1,...,lit} the history of idiosyncratic endowments of household i up to period t. We
simplify notation and disregard individual’s subscripts from now on.
Utility from the consumption stream c = {ct}
∞
t=0 is separable over time. To take into
account the eﬀect of household size, sex and age composition on current utility, consumption is
expressed in adult equivalent units. We allow for unobserved heterogeneity assuming there are
two "types" of agents, characterized by diﬀerent preferences. Unobserved types are common
knowledge in the village, but are not observed by the econometrician. The distribution of types
depends on the same set of characteristics that deﬁne households’ groups. In each group g of
households, there are πη/g unobserved type η households, with
 2
η=1 πη/g = 1 ∀g.










where β ∈ (0,1) is the common discount factor, E0 denotes expectations at t = 0, and
the function uη is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice diﬀerentiable and
5satisfying Inada conditions.
Each agent has the possibility of self-insuring through a storage technology which pays
(risk-free) Rt units of the consumption good for each unit saved. Let at ∈ ℜ+ denote savings
at t. Given the nature of the stochastic process, it is possible to write the autarky problem in
recursive formulation. The (normalized) continuation value Uaut for the agent in autarky is
therefore












Moreover, consumers have access to a full set of state-contingent contracts. At any period
t, after observing the shock lt, the household can buy an Arrow security at+1 (l′) ∈ A for each
possible l′ ∈ L, which pays only conditional on l′ being realized in t + 1. These securities can
be interpreted as informal credit arrangements, whereby households can borrow (or save) with
repayments that are contingent on the future shocks. Let qt (l′,l) be the price of one unit of
consumption delivered in t + 1 conditional on realizations l at t and l′ at t + 1.4 Then each
security costs qt(l′,l)at+1 (l′). In equilibrium, the no arbitrage condition implies that it must
be qt (l′,l) =
π(l′/l)
Rt , with 1/Rt denoting the price for receiving one unit of consumption with














uη (cτ (lτ)) (3)
the normalized continuation utility from an allocation c = {cτ (lτ)}
∞
τ=t , from event history
lt onwards.
We assume that each household has the option to renege on its obligation at any point in
time. As in Krueger and Perri (2006), agents who default lose all their savings, are banned
from future insurance markets, and can only self-insure. Moreover, default entails a utility
cost (or stigma), ψη, which diﬀers across types. The participation constraint that prevents





≥ Uaut (0,lt;g,η) − ψη ∀lt (4)
At period 0 households start with initial asset holdings a0 and initial shock l0. Let Φ0 (a,l,g,η)
be the joint measure of initial assets, shocks, groups and unobserved types.
2.2. Competitive Equilibrium with Solvency Constraints
We use here the concept of competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints introduced by
Alvarez and Jermann (2000). They deﬁne implicit borrowing constraints that are state depen-
4The price depends only on current period realization of earnings and not on the whole history because of
the Markov process properties.
6dent and are such that the individual who borrows at the limit is indiﬀerent between defaulting
and paying his debt (these constraints are called "not too tight solvency constraints").5 The
problem in recursive formulation can be expressed as follows:
V (a,l;g,η) = maxc,{a′(l′)}l′
 
































where we omit the time subscripts for simplicity, denoting with a′ (l′) the choice of Arrow






= Uaut (0,l;g,η) − ψη ∀l,g,η (6)
We restrict ourselves to the analysis of a stationary equilibrium, i.e. one in which the
distribution Φ is constant over time.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Given the initial distribution Φ0, a stationary recursive competitive equi-




l,g,η that are not too tight is deﬁned by policy
functions c(a,l;g,η),{a′ (a,l,l′;g,η)}l′∈L , a value function V (a,l;g,η) for each (a,l,g,η) ∈
A × L × G × {1,2}, an interest rate R, and a measure Φ such that:
1) Given prices, the allocations c(a,l;g,η),{a′ (a,l,l′;g,η)}l′∈L solve the individual opti-
mization problem (5), with A(l;g,η) deﬁned as in (6);


















∂Φ = 0 (8)
3) The measure Φ is stationary, i.e. satisﬁes
Φ = Q   Φ
5We refer to Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and Krueger and Perri (2005, 2006) for a discussion of the de-
centralization of constrained eﬃcient consumption allocations, and a proof of the existence of the competitive
equilibrium with solvency constraints.










π(l′/l) if a′ (a,l,l′;g,η) ∈   A
0 otherwise
(9)
with   A and   L being subsets of the state space for Arrow securities and the state space L
respectively.
The model is solved numerically. The problem is non-standard in that we have to compute
not only the equilibrium prices, but also the endogenous borrowing constraints.
We ﬁrst guess the gross interest rate R, and compute the autarky value function Uaut
using policy function iteration. We guess borrowing limits A(l;g,η) and solve for V (a,l;g,η)
subject to the budget constraint and borrowing constraints, using policy function iteration.




= Uaut(0,l;g,η) − ψη for
each l, g, and η, then we solved for the endogenous borrowing constraints corresponding to
the interest rate R; if not so, then we update the guesses for A(l;g,η) and solve for the value
functions again, until the above equalities hold.
Once we found the value and policy functions with related borrowing limits that are not
too tight, we compute the stationary distribution of assets and earnings as the unique ﬁxed
point of the operator H:
Φ = H(Φ)
where H(Φ) = Q   Φ (and Q is deﬁned as in (9) above).
Given the policy functions and the stationary distribution, we can compute aggregate
wealth as deﬁned in (8). If aggregate wealth is equal to zero, then we found the interest rate
such that markets clear. If not, we update the guess for the interest rate and iterate until
convergence. We approximate value functions with piece-wise linear approximations and use
Brent’s root ﬁnding method to ﬁnd the equilibrium interest rate.
3. Data
Progresa is one of Mexico’s major ongoing programs aimed at fostering the human capital of
poor households in rural areas, through subsidies on health, nutrition and schooling investments
in children. To evaluate the impact of the program a set of 506 rural villages in 7 Mexican
states was randomly divided into 320 treatment and 186 control villages.6 Within each village
(both control and treatment), in a ﬁrst step households were classiﬁed as poor if their income
fell under the poverty line, as non poor otherwise. A ﬁnal list of beneﬁciaries (we will call them
Poor) was determined in a second step, using an index obtained from a discriminant analysis
6Behrman and Todd (2000) provide evidence that the randomization was accurately implemented, i.e. most
variables are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between control and treatment groups.
8which incorporated other household characteristics. The program subsidies were oﬀered to all
Poor households in the treatment villages starting in May 1998 (transfers were actually delayed
by a few months for some households in these villages). In June 1999 the program added new
households to the list of beneﬁciaries through a process called "densiﬁcation", which increased
the percent of transfers’ recipients from 53% to 79% of the sample (we will call these new
beneﬁciaries "Densiﬁcados").7
The information is collected from all beneﬁciary and non beneﬁciary households in control
and treatment villages both before and after the implementation of the program. After two
initial surveys in November 1997 and in March 1998, prior to the program introduction, data
on 24,000 households from the treatment and control villages were collected every six months
between October 1998 and November 1999. By 2000 the localities serving the role of a control
group started receiving Progresa beneﬁts as well.
Progresa gives beneﬁts exclusively to mothers, and cash transfers and nutritional supple-
ments are conditioned on children’s regular school attendance and visits to health care centres.
The size of the grants increases with the grade and, for secondary education, it is slightly higher
for female students. In total, the beneﬁts that families receive are substantial relative to their
incomes. We gather information about the transfers received from an administrative source.8
For our sample, the monthly payment to beneﬁciaries who start receiving transfers in 1998
amounts on average to 26% of our measure of monthly earnings, while the average transfer for
beneﬁciaries that were added to the program only later (Densiﬁcados) is 15% of their monthly
earnings. Despite the fact that the largest component of the beneﬁts is not a pure transfer, but
is conditional on school attendance, it can be said that this component possibly represents a
substantial wealth eﬀect. We therefore exploit this wealth eﬀect to analyze the indirect impact
of the program on consumption risk sharing.
Since we do not have complete information on all assets and saving and borrowing arrange-
ments among families, to retrieve our measures of risk sharing and inequality we exploit avail-
able data on consumption and earnings only. The Progresa survey contains detailed informa-
tion on several categories of food and non-food consumption, and income from several sources.
The Appendix provides a detailed description of the creation of these variables.
We transform consumption and earnings observed in the data in a way that is consistent
with the theoretical model. We follow Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002) and deﬁne consump-
tion as expenditures on food and clothing plus the consumption value of self-production of
these goods, measured at the household level. We ﬁrst compute adult equivalent consumption
dividing total household consumption by a sum of individual weights attributed to household
components based on their sex and age.9 We then normalize each household’s adult equivalent
7This new selection method added more elderly poor who no longer lived with their children (Skouﬁas, Davis,
and de la Vega, 1999).
8Available at http://evaluacion.oportunidades.gob.mx:8010/en/index.php.
9The weights are taken from Townsend (1994) and are the following: for adult males, 1.0; for adult females,
0.9. For males and females aged 13-18, 0.94 and 0.83 respectively; for children aged 7-12, 0.67 regardless of
9consumption by the mean of the same variable in the village at the observation period. We
are mostly interested in analysing the distribution and dynamics of these consumption shares,
especially in relation to the distribution and dynamics of earnings shares.
Our measure of earnings captures all sources of household revenues that are exogenous to
the consumption and saving decisions of households, coherently with the theoretical model.
We measure earnings as the sum of labour earnings from the main job, secondary occupations
and other informal work activities (cooking, sewing, repairs, etc. generating some income),
plus pensions, for all family members. To have a measure of earnings consistent with the
deﬁnition of consumption, we compute adult equivalent earnings for each household in the
sample, normalized by the average village earnings.10
We use data from the three waves from October 1998 to November 1999 (i.e. until the
control group starts receiving the treatment). Some of the households were excluded from
the sample because of missing or inconsistent information on some of the key variables. Our
sample includes a total of about 20,550 households, of which about 7,990 are living in control
and about 12,560 in treated villages. Some descriptive statistics is presented in Table 6 in the
Appendix.
4. Speciﬁcation of Model Functional Forms and Parameterization
Going from the model to the data, we ﬁrst need to make speciﬁc assumptions on preferences
and the labour endowment process, as well as on the distribution of households’ groups and
unobserved types.
Ideally, one would like to estimate the model parameters directly from the available data,
using a method of moments or a maximum likelihood estimator (or their simulated counter-
parts). However, the computational solution of the model is very time intensive, and a formal
estimation was not possible. As a consequence, we calibrate the model parameters to replicate
some key features of the data.
We assume the insurance pool to be identiﬁed by the village, and use only control villages to
calibrate the model. We are interested in measures of consumption smoothing, risk sharing and
inequality. We therefore try to match the ratio of the standard deviation of (log) consumption
to the standard deviation of (log) earnings, both within and between groups, the Lorenz curves
for consumption and earnings, and the correlation between consumption growth and earnings
growth for each group of households.11
Our calibration exercise is actually conducted using the same algorithm we would need for a
method of simulated moments. Given the parameters characterizing the economy (household
preferences, earnings process, unobserved types distribution, etc.), we numerically solve for
gender; for children 4-6, 0.52; for toddlers 1-3, 0.32; and for infants 0.05 (Townsend (1994), Footnote 12, p.554).
10We deﬂate all variables using the National Agricultural Consumer Price Index for Mexico.
11Since it would be impossible to calibrate the model for each village separately, the moments are averages
across the control villages. The Appendix describes in detail how we construct these moments.
10the optimal policy functions and the equilibrium consumption distribution. Our calibration
procedure consists in searching for the parameter vector that obtains the best possible ﬁt to
the data, with the caveat that given the complexity of the problem the optimization algorithm
does not reach convergence in a feasible time framework.
The length of the model period is six months, since that’s the interval at which we observe
household consumption and earnings in the data. Given that our data are observed over a
relatively short period of time (one and a half years), we abstract from business cycle consid-
erations, coherently with the assumption of no aggregate shocks. However, when computing
moments, we remove time eﬀects from both consumption and earnings data. We also remove
diﬀerences due to education levels, sex and age of the household head. These diﬀerences
wouldn’t be accounted for in the theoretical model.
We now introduce the model functional forms and their parameterization.
Instead than attributing a value to each entry of the transition matrix π(l′/l) for the
idiosyncratic shock to labour earnings, we assume that matrix to be the approximation of the
following autoregressive process of order one, common across groups of households:
log(lit) = ρlog(li,t−1) + εit
where εit is an i.i.d. shock normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2
l
 
1 − ρ2 
. For
the numerical solution, we then discretize this process into nine grid points using Tauchen’s
method. The mean of the two components of the individual productivity endowments is
normalized to one for simplicity: E(lit) = 1 at every t, and E (αig) = 1.
The variance of the idiosyncratic shock that best matches our moments is σ2
l = 0.102 (or
a standard deviation of about 0.64 on a yearly basis), with a persistence coeﬃcient ρ of 0.975
(or 0.95 yearly). The variance of the ﬁxed eﬀect is found to be equal to σ2
α = 0.025.





where ση > 0 is a measure of risk aversion for type η, ξη denotes type η’s marginal utility of
consumption (ξ1 normalized to one, ξ2 calibrated), and γ is the parameter that governs how
relative risk aversion varies with the level of consumption. A positive γ is typically interpreted
as subsistence consumption, and implies a Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion (DRRA). Ogaki
and Zhang (2000, 2001) ﬁnd that it is important to allow for DRRA in testing the full risk
sharing hypothesis in economies with low-income households.12 We therefore decide to adopt
12With the assumption of a positive subsistence level in HARA preferences, consumption growth rates are
more volatile for rich individuals than for poor ones, even under full insurance. This is in contrast with the
standard result under Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) that consumption growth is identical for all
agents. Ogaki and Zhang (2001) test the full risk-sharing hypothesis allowing for HARA preferences with the
Pakistani ICRISAT data. They ﬁnd strong evidence against risk sharing across villages, but cannot reject the
11a more general utility function than the CRRA typically used. Using the calibration procedure
described above, however, the parameter γ is found to be negligible, equal to 0.003.
Only sharp diﬀerences between the two unobserved types of households can generate the
kind of cross-sectional heterogeneity in consumption observed in the data.13 According to our
calibration strategy, the ﬁrst type (η = 1) has a coeﬃcient of risk aversion equal to 2.25 and a
negligible utility cost of default (ψ1 = 0.001). The other type of household has a much lower
risk aversion (σ2 = 0.65), but also a lower marginal utility of consumption ξ2 = 0.45, and a
cost of default ψ1 = 0.25 (or about 20% of his current utility for a unit of consumption). Given
these preferences, the less risk averse type is the "borrower" in this economy, while the ﬁrst
type typically wants to save (having no stigma in default, he is more borrowing constrained
than the second type). Households discount the future at a rate β = 0.969 per semester,
which translates into an annual discount rate of 6.5%, in the range of estimated values for that
parameter: in the United States the discount rate is usually estimated to lie between 4% and
15% (see for example Gourinchas and Parker, 2002, and Cagetti, 2003).
As discussed in the data section above, a discriminant analysis was used to classify house-
holds into beneﬁciaries and non beneﬁciaries of the program. That analysis took into account a
variety of household characteristics to capture the "multi-dimensional" nature of poverty (Sk-
ouﬁas, Davis, and Vega, 1999). We take advantage of this classiﬁcation in the data to deﬁne
the three groups of households: "Poor" (g = 1), who receive the transfers from the beginning
of the Program in 1998, "Densiﬁcados" (g = 2), who were added to the list of beneﬁciaries
in June 1999, and "Non Poor" (g = 3), who do not receive any transfer at any time. We
diﬀerentiate households that were classiﬁed as transfers’ recipients from the beginning of the
program ("Poor") from the so called "Densiﬁcados", who were included as beneﬁciaries only
later, since we have reason to believe these households might come from demographic groups
with diﬀerent characteristics (Skouﬁas, Davis, and de la Vega, 1999), and participated to the
program at diﬀerent times. The deﬁnition of these types of households directly from the data
allows us not only to capture a possibly very complex set of characteristics in one variable, but
also to easily conduct counterfactual experiments with the calibrated model. The distribution
of these groups in the model economy corresponds to the observed distribution.
We assume the probability of being a certain type depends on the household being classiﬁed
full insurance hypothesis within each village (with a couple of exceptions), thus showing that results obtained
with the assumption of CRRA can be misleading.
13As already observed in Ligon et al. (2002), this class of limited commitment models is not able to ﬁt cross-
sectional statistics and dynamics at the same time. Ligon et al. (2002) estimate (a simpliﬁed version of) the
model using two diﬀerent equations, one to match consumption levels, the other to ﬁt changes in consumption
shares. Neither of these equations provides estimates that simultaneously explain distribution and dynamics.
We could have increased the number of unobserved types in order to better ﬁt cross-sectional moments.
However, that alternative possibility was ruled out because computationally unfeasible.
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where I {g = s} is an indicator function equal to one if the household belongs to group s, and
π2/g =1−π1/g. Our calibration procedure leads to a value of π1/1 equal to 35%,π 1/2 equal to
43%,a n dπ1/3 of 27%. The prevalent type is therefore the second one, with lower risk aversion
and higher stigma in default.
5. Results
5.1. Data Fit of the Model
In Table 1 and Figure 1 we present the data moments used in calibration, together with the
corresponding moments predicted by the calibrated model. As mentioned above, we concen-
trate our attention on measures of consumption smoothing, consumption inequality, and risk
sharing both within and between groups.
A ﬁrst measure of how well people smooth consumption is the correlation between the
percentage change in consumption shares and the percentage change in earnings shares over
time. Under full insurance that correlation would be equal to zero: household consumption
patterns would be independent of individual idiosyncratic shocks. These correlations in the
data range between 10% f o rt h eN o nP o o rg r o u pt o13% for the Densiﬁcados, all signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero (and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other). Coherently with the
ﬁndings of previous tests of the full insurance hypothesis in developing countries (Townsend,
1994, Ligon, Thomas and Worrall, 2002, and many others), insurance in small Mexican villages
is not complete. However, there seems to be a certain degree of consumption smoothing over
time, which is similar among the three groups of households. The calibrated model ﬁts very
well this feature of the data: the average responses of consumption shares to earnings shares
are around 0.10 for all groups, as shown in the right column of Table 1.
Figure 1 compares the Lorenz curves of earnings and consumption computed for the cal-
ibrated model economy to the ones in the data. The model does a very good job in ﬁtting
earnings and consumption inequality within each group of households.
A commonly used measure of risk sharing is the cross-sectional variance of consumption,
normalized by the cross-sectional variance of earnings to take into account the "need" for risk
sharing in the economy (Attanasio and Rios-Rull, 2000a). Denote with rsw
g and rsb the ratios
of the cross-sectional standard deviation of log consumption to the cross-sectional standard
deviation of log earnings where the standard deviations are measured within each group g and
between groups, respectively.
In a complete markets equilibrium, assuming the only diﬀerence between groups were the
ﬁxed eﬀects in productivity αg, households within each group would end up consuming the
13same share of aggregate consumption over time, proportional to their life time human wealth.
Under full risk sharing the ratio rsw
g would then be zero within each group, but equal to one
between groups (since the variance of consumption between groups would be equal to the
variance of the ﬁxed eﬀects αg).
The average value of the ratio rsw
g we observe in the data is actually closer to one than
to zero, being in the range of 0.89 (for the Non Poor group) to 0.94 (for Densiﬁcados).14 The
between groups ratio, on the other end, is equal to 0.64. The calibrated model predicts a value
of rsw
g equal to 0.69 for Poor, 0.71 for Densiﬁcados, and 0.66 for Non Poor, thus explaining
about 75% of the observed ratios. The equilibrium between groups ratio rsb is calculated to
be 0.93.
The reasons why we do not observe these ratios to assume the values implied by full
insurance could be that risk sharing is far from complete and/or that people do not diﬀer
only in their life time human wealth (or other observable factors which can be accounted
for), but also in unobserved characteristics (taste, patience, etc.), which make them choose
diﬀerent consumption patterns for a same earnings volatility. Generally, we cannot quantify the
importance of unobserved heterogeneity in determining consumption inequality (given income
inequality), and we do not claim to be able to do that here.15 However, if unobserved factors (or
their distributions) are thought to be constant over time, and not aﬀected by changes in policy,
a change in the ratios rsw
g and rsb induced by the introduction of a transfers program would
only be consistent with incomplete insurance. We will exploit that idea for the validation of
the model, using the eﬀects of the Progresa transfers program on risk sharing in the treatment
villages.
5.2. Model Validation: the Eﬀects of a Transfers Program on Risk Sharing
After having calibrated the model using the data from the control villages, we can assess its
performance by comparing the impact of the Progresa program as predicted by the model to
the impact observed in the data in the treatment villages.
To this extent, we simulate the calibrated model attributing to beneﬁciary households the
median value of the actual transfers received: 19% and 11% of monthly income for Pobre
and Densiﬁcados, respectively. Assuming these transfers are perceived as permanent, they
increase the expected life time earnings and therefore autarky values of the beneﬁciaries. While
earnings volatility is not aﬀected by the transfers, the more direct eﬀect of the subsidy is that of
increasing the capability of households to smooth consumption over time. However, the limited
commitment model also predicts that households who receive the transfers have less incentive
to participate in the risk sharing arrangements with other households in the village, given
their higher autarky values. The overall result on consumption smoothing and risk sharing
14These values of the ratios rs
w
g are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other (by pair of groups) at the 1% level.
15Preference heterogeneity, however, seems to be an essential feature of any model that aims at explaining
wealth and consumption inequality (Venti and Wise, 2001, among others).
14cannot be pre-determined a-priori, and will depend on the speciﬁc parameters characterizing
the economy.
Results are shown in Table 2. The ﬁrst column shows the values of the data moments
computed for the treatment villages: in the data, the correlation between growth rates in
consumption shares and growth rates in earnings shares for the treated Poor and Densiﬁcados
groups are 6.5% and 5% respectively, signiﬁcantly lower than the ones for the corresponding
groups in control villages (10.6% and 12.5%). Households who receive the transfers are thus
found to better smooth consumption over time.16 Instead there is not much diﬀerence for
the Non Poor households, whose correlation is 11.7% in the treatment group and 10.4% in
the control group. After the transfers are introduced in the model economy, the equilibrium
correlations between consumption growth and income growth are predicted to be about 6%
for all groups of households. The model therefore captures very well the change for beneﬁciary
households but not so for those who do not receive the transfers.
In the data the ratio of the standard deviation of log consumption to the standard deviation
of log earnings changes very slightly: it decreases from 0.92 to 0.89 for the Poor group, and
from 0.94 to 0.93 for the Densiﬁcados, whereas it increases from 0.89 to 0.93 for the Non Poor.
Consumption variability as a fraction of earnings variability is thus lower among the Poor
households in the treatment than among the Poor in the control villages, and for those families
who receive the transfers only later, but higher in the treatment villages for those who are not
eligible to the transfers. The model does not fully capture the change in these ratios: for the
Poor group, it predicts an increase from 0.69 to 0.75; for the Densiﬁcados, the model correctly
predicts no change; and for the Non Poor group it predicts a decrease from 0.66 to 0.55.
In the model, these changes in the "within" ratios rsw
g can be explained by the fact that
after the introduction of public transfers households change their behaviour in diﬀerent ways,
depending not only on their eligibility to the beneﬁts, but also on their type. Among the bene-
ﬁciaries, while type one households (the "savers") just accumulate more assets when receiving
the transfers, on the opposite less risk averse agents (the "borrowers") increase their borrowing.
For the latter, indeed, the new borrowing constraint becomes looser upon the transfers receipt:
the higher permanent income allows them to repay and thus borrow more, despite their lower
incentive to commit. As a result of this higher borrowing demand, in fact, the equilibrium
interest rate increases (from 3.16% to 3.19%). Given the opposite reactions of these two types
of agents, the standard deviation of consumption within the recipients (especially the Poor)
tends to increase.
On the other hand, probably due to the price eﬀect of the interest rate increase, both types
of households within the non beneﬁciaries (the Non Poor) increase their saving (or decrease
their borrowing), so that the standard deviation of consumption decreases within this group.
16Analogous result is found by Skouﬁas (2007), who conducts a standard test of full insurance using the
Progresa data, and ﬁnds that beneﬁciary households are able to insulate their consumption from ﬂuctuations
in income better than their counterparts in control villages.
15Even though the model does not exactly replicate the changes in the cross-sectional distri-
bution of consumption observed in the data (the kind of preferences heterogeneity considered
here is still too simplistic), from this exercise we do learn that households can react in poten-
tially very diﬀerent ways to the introduction of public transfers in the economy, depending on
their preferences.
As for the between groups measure of risk sharing, the ratio of the standard deviation of log
consumption to the standard deviation of log earnings is on average 70% higher in treatment
than in control villages: this is because the standard deviation of log earnings once transfers are
introduced decreases proportionally more than the standard deviation of log consumption.17
The lower inequality between groups in terms of income does not lead to a comparably lower
consumption inequality. The estimated model predicts a post transfers between groups ratio
equal to 1.44, or 55% higher than the ratio before the transfers, explaining about three quarters
of the increase in the between groups ratio.
We conclude that the model does quite a good job at predicting some of the qualitative
and quantitative features of the eﬀects of a transfers program on risk sharing and inequality
in a small economy. Note that the complete insurance model would imply no changes in the
moments considered here. An alternative model we could have used to describe the economy
would be the self-insurance/incomplete markets model, in which each household would have
access to only one or a ﬁnite number of securities to buﬀer its consumption against income
volatility. Our aim is not that of proving the superiority of a model over another. However, the
self-insurance model would have quite diﬀerent predictions from the limited commitment one.
The injection of liquidity in that model would lead to a decrease in interest rates and more
consumption smoothing by all groups of households. The evidence suggests that beneﬁciary
and non beneﬁciary households are aﬀected by the introduction of transfers in the economy in
quite diﬀerent ways, thus justifying the adoption of a model that at least in theory can predict
these heterogeneous impacts.18
5.3. Risk Sharing and Welfare
As pointed out in Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000a), in an environment with limited commit-
ment a public program can reduce welfare through the crowding out of private risk sharing
arrangements. To evaluate this possibility we can use the calibrated model to further analyze
the changes in risk sharing and welfare induced by the Progresa transfers program.
In Table 3 we present an alternative measure of risk sharing: the average amount of private
17The between group standard deviation of log earnings is on average equal to 0.15 in both control villages
and treatment villages. Adding the transfers to the earnings of recipients leads to a standard deviation of log
income equal to 0.098. The standard deviation of log consumption is 0.10 in control villages, 0.08 in treatment
villages. The ratios used in calibration are diﬀerent from the ratios of numbers given here because they are the
mean of the ratios (which is diﬀerent from the ratio of the means).
18Clearly, the limited commitment model has also diﬃculty capturing these diﬀerent eﬀects.
16transfers to earnings ratios for each group, where transfers are computed as the absolute value
of the diﬀerence between earnings and consumption at each point in time. Using the calibrated
model, we found some evidence of crowding out: the public transfers program reduces between
3 and 10% this ratios with respect to those in the benchmark economy for those groups of
households who receive the subsidies.
Nonetheless, welfare under the public transfers program increases for all groups, especially,
as expected, for the beneﬁciaries. Since the subsistence level is very close to zero, we compute
diﬀerences in terms of equivalent consumption variations, as if the utility function were CRRA.
Type one Poor households are the ones that beneﬁt the most from the program: they are willing
to forgo 20% of their pre-program consumption. Before the introduction of the transfers, type
one households in Densiﬁcados and Non Poor groups are willing to forgo 13% and 5% of their
consumption, respectively, to participate to the public subsidies program. Independently of the
group they belong to, type two households are willing to forgo about 10% of their consumption
for their villages to participate in the program. Given the higher equilibrium interest rate in
the economy with transfers, the "borrower" recipients beneﬁt less than the "savers".
Our results suggest that non beneﬁciary households are also better oﬀ with the Progresa
program: as explained above, these agents choose to save more in the economy with transfers,
which lead to an increase in their consumption and welfare.
5.4. An alternative transfers scheme
The calibrated model shows that all households beneﬁt from the introduction of Progresa, just
because the direct eﬀect of the subsidy on consumption will dominate the indirect eﬀects on
private risk sharing agreements. To net out the eﬀect of the subsidy, it is therefore interesting
to examine a fully funded insurance scheme. In particular, we use the calibrated model to
analyze the eﬀects of a transfer equal to 18% of income (roughly the average transfer in the
Progresa Program), paid when the household income is lower than 75% of the mean income
in the economy: under this scheme all households (also those belonging to the Non Poor
group) receive a transfer if their shock to earnings is suﬃciently bad. These transfers are
totally ﬁnanced by those households with income higher than the threshold through a tax
equal to 3.84% of their income. Under this policy then, at each point in time there would be
a redistribution of resources from the lucky to the less lucky agents.
As Table 4 shows, this policy would also improve consumption smoothing: whereas the
simulated policy slightly increases the ratio of the standard deviation of log consumption to
the standard deviation of log earnings, the correlation between growth rates in consumption
shares and growth rates in earnings shares is halved for all groups. Nonetheless, as presented
in Table 5, the change in the ratios of private transfers to earnings shows that there would
be crowding-out of private risk sharing. More interestingly, the policy would not be welfare
improving for all households: as measured by the equivalent consumption variation, type two
17households would lose from the introduction of this insurance scheme. The income eﬀect of
this kind of policy on the borrowing constraints is much less strong than in a "pure" transfer
program, since permanent income increases by less (depending on the distribution of earnings
shocks for each group of households). This together with the fact that the equilibrium interest
rate increases (from 3.16% to 3.20%) lead to a reduction in the welfare of type two, who is
typically a borrower.
6. Conclusions
Our structural approach allows us to take into account the direct and indirect eﬀects of public
policies on individual behaviour. We ﬁnd that a limited commitment model can replicate some
of the features of consumption smoothing and cross-sectional variation in the small Mexican
villages surveyed as part of the Progresa program. In particular, we ﬁnd that heterogeneity in
preferences is a crucial factor for explaining the quite unequal cross-sectional distribution of
consumption. Diﬀerent preferences dictate dramatically diﬀerent behaviours with respect to
saving and consumption, and also dramatically diﬀerent reactions to changes in the environ-
ment. Therefore, in evaluating the eﬀects of a public transfers program on risk sharing and
welfare, it is of paramount importance to allow for such heterogeneous response.
Using data from the treatment villages, we validate the model with a diﬀerent sample
than the one used in calibration. The model accurately predicts the increase in consumption
smoothing for the recipient households, and replicates the observed decrease in risk sharing
between beneﬁciaries and non beneﬁciaries.
Our results suggest that private risk sharing agreements are partially, even if not totally,
crowded-out by the introduction of the Progresa subsidy. Nonetheless, the direct eﬀect of the
subsidy on consumption prevails on the indirect eﬀects on private risk sharing arrangements,
and welfare increases for all households, even for the non beneﬁciaries, who save and consume
more after the introduction of the public transfers.
A counterfactual, fully ﬁnanced, insurance scheme is also evaluated. While overall improv-
ing consumption smoothing, the eﬀect of this policy on welfare depends on preferences: some
households would in fact loose from the introduction of such policy. This again stresses the
importance of accounting for this dimension in the evaluation of public programs.
Our results therefore suggest that an important direction for future research would be that
of ﬁnding tractable ways to model heterogeneity in risk and, possibly, time preferences when
analyzing the equilibrium eﬀects of public policies. In this, our paper is in line with the recent
strand of the literature (Kurosaki, 1999, Mazzocco and Saini, 2007, Schulhofer-Wohl, 2007)
that investigates (mostly in reduced form) the eﬀects of individual preferences heterogeneity
on risk sharing arrangements.
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The Data
Household food consumption is reported by food item (in detail for diﬀerent kinds of fruits
and vegetables, meats, cereals, etc.) in quantity consumed and/or value bought for the whole
household in the previous week, and it includes both purchased and self-produced goods.
Comparable information is available only in the surveys conducted after the beginning of the
program, so we use the three waves in October/November 1998, May/June 1999 and November
1999.
Whenever the expenditure on a certain item is missing, but the quantity consumed is
available, we impute the consumption value using the price of that item at the village level. The
latter is computed as in Angelucci and De Giorgi (2006). We ﬁrst construct household-speciﬁc
prices for each item as the ratio of expenditures to the quantity bought of that item. If we have
at least 20 observations of household-speciﬁc prices for a village, we use the median of these
observations in the village to impute consumption values (multiplying the quantity consumed
by the price). Otherwise, we use similarly computed median prices at the municipality or
state level. If none of these prices are available, we use national prices. All home-produced
consumption values are imputed in this way. In November 1999 the survey does not give
direct information on home production, but does contain quantities consumed and quantities
purchased for each item. In that wave consumption values are set equal to consumption
expenditures if the quantity consumed is lower or equal to the quantity bought. We apply
median prices as described above to evaluate the diﬀerence between quantity consumed and
quantity purchased. Weekly consumption is transformed into semester values by multiplying
it by 24.
Consumption on clothing is reported in values spent for general items (shoes, textiles, etc.)
in the previous six months.
The earnings variable is the sum of labour income from the main job and other secondary
occupations, informal work activities generating some income, plus pensions received by all
members of the household. We impute semester earnings from daily, weekly and monthly
earnings.19 We assume there are six working days per week, and four weeks per month. When
the observation on earnings is missing but the individual has worked in the week before the
interview, we impute earnings by multiplying the number of hours worked by the median
hourly wage rate for individuals with the same age, sex and education level. Informal work
generating income includes the provision of transportation services, cooking, sewing, repairs,
construction and similar, and its value is computed as the diﬀerence between the revenues from
these activities and the costs incurred in performing them. Further, we include in the earnings
19Some individuals report also fortnight or annual wages. However, we found the monthly mean of these
wages is almost twice the monthly mean of wages reported daily, weekly, or monthly (which is the majority),
so we drop these observations (losing 1,920 households in total over the three waves, or 2.7% of the sample).
19variable all pension income related to retirement, old age, invalidity or widowhood.
Progresa transfers to treated households are available in a separate administrative database
and are reported every two months. They are the sum of monetary transfers for food support,
the educational grants, and other money to be spent on school material (books, etc.). The
average monthly transfer is around 225 pesos per beneﬁciary household (expressed in real
October 1998 pesos). On average, about 64% of this is money for food support for the whole
household, 33% is for the educational grant, and the rest is allocated to school supplies.20
We convert all variables in adult equivalent values as described in the text, and deﬂate
them using the Agricultural Consumer Price Index for Mexico (as reported by the Central
Bank of Mexico).
We trim the bottom and top percentile of the earnings and consumption variables to elim-
inate outliers. Our variables are very likely to be measured with error, not only because they
are self-reported, but also because we impute some values (in order not to loose a large part
of the data). However, measurement error distributions shouldn’t diﬀer between control and
treatment villages, so our comparisons should still be valid. Moreover, the measurement error
problem should be mitigated by the fact that most of the moments we compute are given by
ratios of standard deviations and correlations between variables.
Last, the surveys contain also information on several demographic variables. Whenever age,
sex or education levels are missing for an individual in a certain wave, we try to recover them
from other waves. Still, we need to drop 2,740 observations from the original sample because
of missing or inconsistent information on any of these variables. Table 6 shows descriptive
statistics of the sample used in estimation.
Construction of the Moments
In order to construct the ratios rsw
g of the standard deviation of log consumption to the stan-
dard deviation of log earnings within each group g of households, we ﬁrst compute numerator
and denominator separately for each group in each village. More precisely, we ﬁrst divide each
variable (earnings or consumption) by the mean of that variable in the village at the observa-
tion period, so that we consider "shares" instead than levels. We then compute the standard
deviation of the residuals obtained from regressing the log of the shares on time dummies and
demographic characteristics of the household head (age and dummies for sex and education).
We construct the ratios rsw
g as the mean across villages of the ratios of standard deviations
of consumption residuals to standard deviations of earnings residuals, for each group, for con-
trol and treatment villages. To compute moments for the ﬁrst group (the Poor), we consider
villages with at least 30 households in that group. For the other two groups of households,
we require at least 20 observations per village. Doing this allows us to have at least thirty
20The percentages are computed for households belonging to the Poor group. For Densiﬁcados, the food
support accounts for 81% of the transfers.
20villages in the control and thirty villages in the treatment sub sample. There are on average
48 observations per village in the ﬁrst group, 33 in the Densiﬁcados group, and 29 in the Non
Poor group.
Similarly, to construct the between groups measure of risk sharing, rsb, we consider the
mean of the ratios for villages with at least 30 observations. There are 87 villages in the control
group and 133 villages in the treatment group involved in this calculation.
Table 7 shows that the mean standard deviation of log earnings does not diﬀer between
control and treatment villages (except than for the Non Poor group: however, the diﬀerence
is only by one basis point). We consider the groups in control and treatment villages to be
facing the same kind of risk.
Correlations between the growth rate of consumption shares and the growth rate of earnings
shares are computed pooling all individuals, since only the time dimension is important in
this case. Table 8 shows the coeﬃcients of a regression of the growth rate of consumption
shares on the growth rate on earnings shares for the three groups in the treatment and in the
control villages, and the p-values of the test that compares these coeﬃcients between treatment
and control.21 For both the groups of households who receive the transfers in the treatment
villages the sensitivity of consumption to income is signiﬁcantly lower, at the 5% level, than
for the corresponding groups in the control sample. Households who do not beneﬁt from the
transfers in the treatment villages result to be more sensitive to changes in earnings than the
corresponding households in the control villages, but this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant.
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ModelData Data Data Data Model Model Model Model
Moments Moments Moments Moments Treatment Villages Treatment Villages Treatment Villages Treatment Villages % Change wrt Control % Change wrt Control % Change wrt Control % Change wrt Control Model with Transfers Model with Transfers Model with Transfers Model with Transfers % Change wrt Benchmark % Change wrt Benchmark % Change wrt Benchmark % Change wrt Benchmark
Corr(∆ln c, ∆ln l) - Poor 0.065 -0.384 0.062 -0.424
Corr(∆ln c, ∆ln l) - Densificados 0.049 -0.609 0.060 -0.425
Corr(∆ln c, ∆ln l) - Non Poor 0.117 0.129 0.062 -0.443
Stdev(ln c)/Stdev(ln l) - Poor 0.887 -0.033 0.758 0.093
Stdev(ln c)/Stdev(ln l) - Densificados 0.925 -0.013 0.706 -0.003
Stdev(ln c)/Stdev(ln l) - Non Poor 0.928 0.045 0.548 -0.175
Stdev(ln c)/Stdev(ln l) - b/w groups 1.039 0.631 1.444 0.554
Table 2: Model Fit - Treatment Villages Table 2: Model Fit - Treatment Villages Table 2: Model Fit - Treatment Villages Table 2: Model Fit - Treatment VillagesAverage Private Transfers over Earnings (|c-y|/y)  Average Private Transfers over Earnings (|c-y|/y)  Average Private Transfers over Earnings (|c-y|/y)  Average Private Transfers over Earnings (|c-y|/y)  Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark
Economy with  Economy with  Economy with  Economy with 
Transfers Transfers Transfers Transfers
% Change % Change % Change % Change
Type 1 Household Pobre 0.513 0.457 -0.109
Densificado 0.513 0.496 -0.033
Non Pobre 0.512 0.572 0.117
Type 2 Household Pobre 0.271 0.247 -0.089
Densificado 0.271 0.248 -0.085
Non Pobre 0.271 0.284 0.048
Equivalent Consumption Variation* Equivalent Consumption Variation* Equivalent Consumption Variation* Equivalent Consumption Variation*
Type 1 Household Pobre 20.0%
Densificado 13.4%
Non Pobre 4.7%
Type 2 Household Pobre 9.5%
Densificado 9.5%
Non Pobre 9.6%
Table 3: Risk Sharing and Welfare Measures Before and After the Introduction of the Transfers Table 3: Risk Sharing and Welfare Measures Before and After the Introduction of the Transfers Table 3: Risk Sharing and Welfare Measures Before and After the Introduction of the Transfers Table 3: Risk Sharing and Welfare Measures Before and After the Introduction of the Transfers
* The percentage of consumption to give to the agent at each period in the benchmark 
model economy in order to make him indifferent between the benchmark and the 
economy with transfersMoments Moments Moments Moments Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark Policy Policy Policy Policy
Corr(∆ln c, ∆ln l) - Poor 0.108 0.05
Corr(∆ln c, ∆ln l) - Densificados 0.104 0.048
Corr(∆ln c, ∆ln l) - Non Poor 0.112 0.052
Stdev(ln c)/Stdev(ln l) - Poor 0.694 0.725
Stdev(ln c)/Stdev(ln l) - Densificados 0.708 0.768
Stdev(ln c)/Stdev(ln l) - Non Poor 0.663 0.679
Stdev(ln c)/Stdev(ln l) - b/w groups 0.929 1.03
Table 4: Fully Funded Insurance Policy Table 4: Fully Funded Insurance Policy Table 4: Fully Funded Insurance Policy Table 4: Fully Funded Insurance PolicyAverage Private Transfers over Earnings (|c-y|/y)  Average Private Transfers over Earnings (|c-y|/y)  Average Private Transfers over Earnings (|c-y|/y)  Average Private Transfers over Earnings (|c-y|/y)  Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark
Economy with  Economy with  Economy with  Economy with 
Insurance Insurance Insurance Insurance
% Change % Change % Change % Change
Type 1 Household Pobre 0.513 0.459 -0.105
Densificado 0.513 0.515 0.004
Non Pobre 0.512 0.557 0.088
Type 2 Household Pobre 0.271 0.227 -0.164
Densificado 0.271 0.222 -0.182
Non Pobre 0.271 0.245 -0.094
Equivalent Consumption Variation* Equivalent Consumption Variation* Equivalent Consumption Variation* Equivalent Consumption Variation*
Type 1 Household Pobre 4.1%
Densificado 3.9%
Non Pobre 3.3%
Type 2 Household Pobre -2.4%
Densificado -3.6%
Non Pobre -2.7%
Table 5: Risk Sharing and Welfare Measures Before and After the Introduction of the Insurance Policy Table 5: Risk Sharing and Welfare Measures Before and After the Introduction of the Insurance Policy Table 5: Risk Sharing and Welfare Measures Before and After the Introduction of the Insurance Policy Table 5: Risk Sharing and Welfare Measures Before and After the Introduction of the Insurance Policy
* The percentage of consumption to give to the agent at each period in the benchmark model economy 
in order to make him indifferent between the benchmark and the economy with transfersVariable Variable Variable Variable Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment Control Control Control Control
Number of Households:
October/November 1998 13,206 8,277
May/June 1999 12,060 7,574
Nov-99 12,414 8,115
Mean Age of Household Head 47.9 48.4
Gender of Household Head (% Male) 90.3 89.8
Mean Family Size (Townsend Weight) 4.61 4.67
Education (Head):
No School 31.9% 30.8%
Some Primary 46.5% 48.9%
Primary 15.0% 14.0%
Secondary 3.9% 3.8%
% Poor in Sample 54.2 51.5
% Non Poor 21.8 21.9
Mean Adult Equivalent Monthly Earnings (real pesos 1998):
All sample 281 282
Poor 236 232
Densificados 329 328
Non Poor 345 344
Mean Adult Equivalent Monthly Consumption (Food + Clothing):
All sample 189 175
Poor 177 156
Densificados 203 199
Non Poor 201 192
Table 6: Data Descriptive Statistics Table 6: Data Descriptive Statistics Table 6: Data Descriptive Statistics Table 6: Data Descriptive StatisticsMean Standard Deviation of Log Earnings* Mean Standard Deviation of Log Earnings* Mean Standard Deviation of Log Earnings* Mean Standard Deviation of Log Earnings* Poor Poor Poor Poor Dens.dos Dens.dos Dens.dos Dens.dos Non Poor Non Poor Non Poor Non Poor All All All All
CONTROL 0.492 0.532 0.529 0.51
(0.081) (0.079) (0.075) (0.065)
Observations 3502 1650 1173 13799
TREATMENT 0.487 0.533 0.524 0.51
(0.071) (0.080) (0.066) (0.068)
Observations 4897 978 1317 18708
p-value of Difference b/w St. Dev.s 0.003 0.662 0.074 0.271
education of the household head, and a time dummy.
Dependent Var.: % Change in Cons. Share* Dependent Var.: % Change in Cons. Share* Dependent Var.: % Change in Cons. Share* Dependent Var.: % Change in Cons. Share* Poor Poor Poor Poor Dens.dos Dens.dos Dens.dos Dens.dos Non Poor Non Poor Non Poor Non Poor All All All All
CONTROL: Coeff. on % Change in Earn. Share 0.095 0.11 0.081 0.095
(0.015) (0.022) (0.021) (0.011)
Observations 3576 1554 1315 6445
TREATMENT: Coeff. on % Change in Earn. Share 0.056 0.042 0.097 0.062
(0.012) (0.019) (0.020) (0.009)
Observations 4804 2047 1838 8689
p-value of Difference between Coefficients 0.048 0.0183 0.5766 0.024
Table 7: Standard Deviation of Log Earnings, by groups and treatment.  Table 7: Standard Deviation of Log Earnings, by groups and treatment.  Table 7: Standard Deviation of Log Earnings, by groups and treatment.  Table 7: Standard Deviation of Log Earnings, by groups and treatment. 
Table 8: Sensitivity of Consumption Changes to Changes in Earnings, by groups and treatment.  Table 8: Sensitivity of Consumption Changes to Changes in Earnings, by groups and treatment.  Table 8: Sensitivity of Consumption Changes to Changes in Earnings, by groups and treatment.  Table 8: Sensitivity of Consumption Changes to Changes in Earnings, by groups and treatment. 
*Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Control variables are age, dummies on sex and 
education of the household head, and a time dummy.
*Standard errors in parenthesis. We control for age, dummies on sex and 